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THE EVOLUTION OF RIPARIANISM IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Water allocation in the United States generally is governed by state 
law rather than federal law.1  Because of their vastly differing 
experiences regarding water, different parts of the United States have 
developed different approaches to property rights relating to the use of 
water.2  In states located largely to the east of Kansas City, water was 
readily available at little or no cost.3  Despite occasional water quality 
issues caused by human activities, shortages were rare and short-lived.  
Riparian rights, which treat water as a form of common property, 
evolved in this relatively low-conflict setting.4  When riparian rights 
proved ill-adapted to settings where water was in chronic short supply, 
traditional riparian rights were abandoned in favor of other models of 
water law.5  Thus, in states to the west of Kansas City, people considered 
 
* Professor of Law, Villanova University; B.B.A., Univ. of Mich. (1965); J.D., Detroit 
College of Law (1968); LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, George Washington 
Univ. (1969); LL.M. in Environmental Law, Columbia Univ. (1974).  Professor Dellapenna 
served as Rapporteur of the Water Resources Committee of the International Law 
Association, and in that capacity led the drafting of the Berlin Rules on Water Resources 
(2004).  He is also Director of the Model Water Code Project of the American Society of 
Civil Engineers.  
1. New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597 (2008) (applying state-law created riparian 
rights in an interstate regulatory dispute); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) 
(recognizing the controlling importance of the state law of prior appropriation in an interstate 
water allocation dispute).  But see Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) 
(applying federal reserved water rights instead of state-law appropriative rights in favor of 
American Indians). 
2. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption and Water Law Reform, 15 
WIDENER L. REV. 409, 413 (2010) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption]; 
Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1514 (1984).  See generally 
DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
AMERICAN WEST (1985); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., The Role of Climate in Shaping Western 
Water Institutions, 7 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1 (2003). 
3. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, at 413. 
4. Id. at 413. 
5. Id. at 413–14. 
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water to be scarce, or at least misplaced.6  There, the right to use water 
came to be treated as a sort of private property under the doctrine of 
appropriative rights.7  Yet when demand began to outstrip supply east of 
Kansas City, states substituted a form of community or public property 
that has come to be called regulated riparianism for traditional riparian 
rights.8 
Under common property systems like riparian rights, co-owners are 
left to their individual judgments to decide whether, when, and how to 
use the resource.9  Collective decision-making, operating through courts, 
only becomes involved when one use directly interferes with another, 
with such disputes being decided according to the reasonableness of the 
competing uses.10  Under appropriative rights, the right to use water is 
carefully defined in terms of the location, duration, amount, and priority 
of use.11  Water rights are administered by a state agency for the sole 
purpose of enforcing the previously defined property rights.12  While this 
system in many respects functions like a private property system, it lacks 
at least one major feature of private property: appropriative rights are, 
as a practical matter, largely not transferrable separately from the land 
for which, or to a different use than the use for which, the water was 
originally appropriated.13  Under regulated riparianism, water is 
 
6. Id.  For the classic statement of this notion, see United States v. Gerlach Live Stock 
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728–29 (1950). 
7. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, at 414.  See generally Robert E. 
Beck & Owen L. Anderson, Introduction and Background to Prior Appropriation, in 1 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 11.01 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2010). 
8. City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102, 1149 n.44 (Conn. 2002) 
(applying the term “regulated riparian” to Connecticut’s water allocation law).  See generally 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra 
note 7, § 9.01 [hereinafter Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism]. 
9. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under “Pure” Riparian 
Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, §§ 7.02–.03(e) [hereinafter 
Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water]. 
10. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 130, 133–35 (Ark. 1955) (deciding 
whether the plaintiff, a boat-livery owner, could enjoin the defendant, a farmer, from 
pumping water from a lake to irrigate his rice field). 
11. See, e.g., Neb. Game & Parks Comm’n v. 25 Corp., 463 N.W.2d 591, 597–602 (Neb. 
1990) (exploring the nature and extent of appropriative rights). 
12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 244 (Neb. 1940) (“It is the duty 
of the state under our irrigation code to administer the waters of streams and rivers to 
prevent waste, to protect prior appropriators against subsequent appropriators, and to 
enforce all adjudicated water rights in accordance with their terms.”). 
13. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of 
Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 347–51 (2000) [hereinafter 
Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right]; Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, 
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allocated and reallocated by a collective decision-making process, most 
commonly by time-limited licenses issued by a state agency on the basis 
of the reasonableness of the proposed use.14  Disputes between 
competing licensees may be resolved by the state agency or by a court, 
with the goal to enforce license terms and conditions.15 
With this brief introduction, we can turn to examining the origin and 
evolution of riparian rights in the United States.  As the very names 
used to describe the three different property systems suggest, traditional 
riparian rights are closely linked to, and in some places are already in 
the process of evolving into, regulated riparianism; whereas 
appropriative rights are based on fundamentally different premises and 
have gone off in a different direction from the riparian tradition.  Thus, 
this Article will say little about appropriative rights, but will discuss at 
some length regulated riparianism as well as traditional riparian rights. 
II.  THE ORIGIN OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
The basic concept of riparian rights is that an owner of land abutting 
a body of water has the right to have the water continue to flow across 
or stand on the land,16 subject to the equal rights of each owner to make 
proper use of the water.17  Today, this is generally acknowledged as the 
common law of water rights, but there is considerable controversy 
regarding how this came about.  It is commonplace to state that the 
doctrine of riparian rights originated in England and was brought to 
America by the English colonists.18  Even Justice Oliver Wendell 
 
Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 
28 ENVTL. L. 919, 961 (1998). 
14. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(a). 
15. See generally id. § 9.03(c)–(d) (providing examples of disputes resolved by various 
courts and approaches to water transfers). 
16. Rights in flowing (stream) water are now generally the same as rights in standing 
(lake) water.  See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in 1 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 7, § 6.02(b) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian 
Rights]. 
17. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water, supra note 9, at § 7.02.  See generally id. 
§§ 7.02–.03(e) (discussing the development of the right to use water and the resolution of 
conflicts among users). 
18. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 280 n.4 (2000); DANIEL W. 
BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 29 (1989); Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the 
Integration of U.S. Water Law and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2000); Bernhard Grossfeld & Edward J. Eberle, Patterns of 
Order in Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
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Holmes seems to have held this view, although it is not entirely clear 
whether he was thinking of long-standing English common law or of the 
English common law as of the late nineteenth century.19  The truth of 
the matter is somewhat different. 
A.  English Antecedents?20 
In fact, the law of England was very different from riparian rights 
until well into the nineteenth century, long after American 
independence.21  Early English cases explained water rights as grounded 
in “ancient possession” (that is, in long-standing enjoyment of the 
benefits of the stream akin to prescription or ancient custom, or from 
royal grant).22  William Blackstone concluded that prior possession of 
the water, however brief, gave a superior right against one who had 
never before been in possession, basing his supposed right on the now 
generally rejected theory that one who came to a nuisance had no cause 
of action.23  Although Blackstone apparently was followed in England 
briefly,24 the English common law may well have had roots in what 
became riparian theory but without any developed theory of riparian 
rights.25  At the extreme, English law might be said to have oscillated 
back and forth between an emphasis on the rights of landowners to 
 
291, 299 (2003). 
19. See Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1909) (“[The 
Howell Code, adopting the common law as the law of New Mexico,] is far from meaning that 
patentees of a ranch on the San Pedro are to have the same rights as owners of an estate on 
the Thames.”). 
20. Much of the text in Parts II.A–B has been adapted from Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND 
POLITICS OF WATER 189–204 (Joseph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., 2008). 
21. See JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 282–83 
(2004). 
22. See id. at 117–40; Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of 
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 267–73 (1990); Samuel C. Wiel, Waters: 
American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133, 141–45 (1919) [hereinafter Wiel, 
French Authority]. 
23. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 402–03 (photo. reprint 1979) (1766); see 
also GETZLER, supra note 21, at 187–92; T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the 
Riparian Doctrine, 28 MO. L. REV. 60, 96–99 (1963).  Carol Rose saw Blackstone’s approach 
as a sharp break from the established tradition rather than as building upon it.  See Rose, 
supra note 22, at 274–77.  For the modern approach to “coming to the nuisance,” see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1979). 
24. GETZLER, supra note 21, at 207, 220. 
25. See id. at 44–45. 
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water flowing over or standing on their land and temporal priority,26 but 
this merely serves to demonstrate that there was no settled law of water 
allocation in England until fairly late.  The first English precedent that 
fully enunciated the doctrine of riparian rights did not come until 183327 
and relied heavily on the already decided American cases.28 
The uncertainty about the nature and extent of water rights in 
England should not be a surprise.  William Holdsworth, a major 
historian of the common law, pointed out that before the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the common law generally confused claims of 
natural right and claims of easement because of the use of the assize of 
nuisance (and later, actions on the case) to provide a remedy for both 
types of right.29  The confusion, which focused controversies on specific 
uses rather than on the abstract source of the right, will perhaps prevent 
us from ever determining definitely which view of the early common law 
of water rights actually represents the understanding of those early 
courts; but it seems too much to conclude that there was a developed or 
coherent theory of riparian rights brought over from England by the 
colonists.  Instead, the earliest such developed, albeit not entirely 
coherent, expression of what we would now term “riparian rights” 
comes from the report of a jury instruction in New Jersey given in 1795. 
B.  James Kinsey and the American Origin of Riparian Rights 
Merritt v. Parker arose from a dispute over millraces and millponds 
in southwestern New Jersey.  Parker built a milldam across Rancocas 
Creek as early as 1780 and operated a sawmill from the resulting head of 
water.30  The millpond overflowed onto Merritt’s land.31  In May 1793, 
with Merritt constructing his own millworks, the state legislature 
 
26. Id. at 193.  See generally Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of 
Water Rights, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 850–98 (1995).  The Scott and Coustalin study must 
be used carefully; it suffers from the sort of anachronistic reading of early materials that we 
shall see characterizes Samuel Wiel’s purported history, particularly because the authors 
seem intent on reading their scheme of analysis into the records of past litigation over water 
even when it does not fit.  See infra text accompanying notes 51–63. 
27. See Mason v. Hill, (1833) 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B.) 696–701; 5 B. & Ad. 1. 
28. See GETZLER, supra note 21, at 282–83; Rose, supra note 22, at 276–77; Samuel C. 
Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the Common Law 
and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 245 (1918) [hereinafter Wiel, Origin]; Wiel, 
French Authority, supra note 22, at 145–47. 
29. W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 328–29 (1926). 
30. Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460, 462–64 (1795). 
31. Id. at 462. 
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enacted a private bill to confirm Parker’s right to maintain his dam.32  
Merritt thereafter completed a trench to divert water from Parker’s 
millpond where it flooded onto Merritt’s land to operate his own 
sawmill, returning the water to Rancocas Creek by way of a “rivulet” 
across Parker’s land below Parker’s mill.33  Parker then built a dam 
across the rivulet, flooding out Merritt’s sawmill.34  Merritt sued Parker 
for interfering with Merritt’s use of the water.  Parker set up as a 
defense a right to resist Merritt’s unnatural increase of the flow of the 
rivulet.35  Chief Justice James Kinsey of New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
agreed.  In the course of his analysis, he provided an apparently 
straightforward statement of the natural flow theory of riparian rights in 
his instructions to the jury: 
 
 In general, it may be observed, when a man purchases a piece 
of land, through which a natural water-course flows, he has a 
right to make use of it in its natural state, but not to stop or 
divert it to the prejudice of another.  Aqua currit, et debet 
currere, is the language of the law.  The water flows in its natural 
channel, and ought always to be permitted to run there, so that 
all, through whose land it pursues its natural course, may 
continue to enjoy the privilege of using it for their own purposes.  
It cannot legally be diverted from its course without the consent 
of all who have an interest in it.  If it should be turned into 
another channel, or stopped, and this illegal step should be 
persisted in, I should think a jury right in giving almost any 
valuation which the party thus injured should think proper to 
affix to it.  This principle lies at the bottom of all the cases which 
I have met with, and it is perfectly reasonable in itself, and at the 
same time so firmly settled as a doctrine of the law, that it should 
never be abandoned or departed from.36 
 
Chief Justice Kinsey’s analysis contained enough vague references to 
“[those] who have an interest” in the water to enable an argument that 
he actually did not endorse a claim of a natural right to the natural 
flow.37  Reinforcing the appearance of a natural flow theory, however, 
 
32. Id. at 464. 
33. Id. at 462. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). 
37. See id. 
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was Kinsey’s assertion that it was irrelevant that neither Merritt’s 
diversion of the water nor his increasing of the return-flow in the rivulet 
did any actual damage to Parker.38  Kinsey even stated that Parker had 
enough water left in his pond to meet the needs for his mill and that the 
increase of water flowing in the rivulet would be actionable even if it 
were proven to be a benefit to the land.39  On the other hand, Kinsey 
also observed that Merritt was interfering with a dam that Parker had 
had “in his possession” for “several years,” and that Merritt was 
appropriating to himself the benefits of Parker’s labor in building the 
dam.40  This begins to sound like Blackstone’s notion of priority of use.  
Kinsey, however, further confused the issue by noting that Merritt had 
unreasonably diverted water and had unreasonably increased the flow in 
the rivulet.41  In fact, all three theories are succinctly asserted in the 
short penultimate paragraph of the instruction: 
 
 It is unreasonable, and the doctrine cannot be countenanced, 
that when one has erected a dam, and at a considerable expense 
has appropriated water to his own use, another person by cutting 
a canal shall be permitted to diminish his supply, and avail 
himself of the labor and work of the original owner, without 
defraying any portion of the expense that had been incurred, or 
undertaking to assist in keeping these works in repair.  It would 
be equally unreasonable that one man should have a right to turn 
more water over the land of his neighbor than would naturally go 
in that direction; and so far as regards the right, it is altogether 
immaterial whether it may be productive of benefit or injury.  No 
one has a right to compel another to have his property improved 
in a particular manner; it is as illegal to force him to receive a 
benefit as to submit to an injury.42 
 
Despite Kinsey’s confusion of what today are recognized as several 
distinct theories, one must recall that none of these doctrines existed in 
1795.  For Kinsey, these references to prior use, appropriation, and 
perhaps even to reasonableness, were merely descriptive terms that he 
used to justify his ultimate conclusion that a landowner has a legal right 
 
38. Id. at 465. 
39. Id. at 464.  Perhaps the real injury to Parker was Merritt’s opening of a competing 
mill.  A later court recognized this possibility expressly.  Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Ill. 67, 72 (1867). 
40. Merritt, 1 N.J.L. at 463, 465. 
41. Id. at 465–66. 
42. Id. 
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against interference in the natural flow of water across her land—or at 
least against unreasonable interference with the natural flow.43  Notably 
lacking from Kinsey’s jury instructions was any reference to prior 
authority.  What he said in this regard—“This principle lies at the 
bottom of all the cases which I have met with, and it is perfectly 
reasonable in itself, and at the same time so firmly settled as a doctrine 
of the law, that it should never be abandoned or departed from”44—tells 
us nothing about what those authorities were, and no one thus far has 
found any such earlier cases. 
Despite his apparent confusions, his jury instructions set the pattern 
for other courts.  At least six decisions in the thirty years after Merritt 
largely followed Kinsey’s approach—albeit without direct reference to 
that decision.45  On the other hand, Joseph Angell, in his highly 
influential treatise on water law (the first in the English language), was 
content merely to paraphrase Kinsey, citing Merritt in a footnote.46  No 
less an authority than Samuel Wiel (whom we shall meet in a moment) 
identified Angell’s work as the source of Justice Joseph Story’s opinion 
in Tyler v. Wilkinson,47 an opinion that Wiel and others have identified 
as the landmark source of riparian rights theory in England and 
America.48 
C.  The Debate over French Influence on Riparian Rights 
Despite the fairly clear line tracing the origin of riparian rights back 
to Merritt v. Parker, there actually is considerable controversy over the 
true origin of riparian rights.  This controversy arises from the debate 
over the need to replace riparian rights with something, a debate that 
 
43. See id. 
44. Id. at 463. 
45. Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584, 590–92 (1818); Weston v. Alden, 8 Mass. (8 
Tyng) 136, 136–37 (1811); Reid v. Gifford, 1 Hopk. Ch. 416, 419–20 (N.Y. Ch. 1825); Merritt 
v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306, 320, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820); Platt v. Johnson & Root, 15 
Johns. 213, 217–18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 313–14, 320–21 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1805).  Two other courts echoed Chief Justice Kinsey’s comment about the need to 
protect the expense and labor of the first user: Cook v. Hull, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 269, 271 
(1826); and Colburn v. Richards, 13 Mass. (13 Tyng) 420, 422 (1816). 
46. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW, IN RELATION TO 
WATER-COURSES 5 (1824). 
47. 24 F. Cas. 472 (D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).  Justice Story admitted in the Tyler opinion 
that he valued Angell’s work.  Id. at 473. 
48. Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 145–47; see also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW 
OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:7 (2009); John Harrison, The Constitution of 
Economic Liberty, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 709, 713 n.10 (2008). 
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was reaching a critical stage at the turn from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century in the states west of Kansas City;49 the debate is now 
passing into a similar critical stage in states to the east of Kansas City.50  
So long as the question of reforming or replacing riparian rights 
continues to be debated, the debate over the source of the riparian 
rights doctrine will continue to be important.  In this context, Samuel 
Wiel, one of the leading authorities on water law in the early years of 
the twentieth century, developed an elaborate argument that the 
doctrine of riparian rights was imported into the United States from the 
Code Napoléon by James Kent and Joseph Story.51 
Kent and Story were preeminent early-nineteenth century jurists, 
scholars, and teachers of the law, with Kent serving many years as 
Chancellor of New York and Story serving longer as Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court than anyone until Justice William O. Douglas 
surpassed his tenure in 1974.  About fifty years after Wiel’s writings, 
Arthur Maass and Hiller Zobel presented a new interpretation of the 
historical data, concluding that riparian doctrine had firm roots in 
English and American common law and that its modern forms are a 
natural evolution of that common law.52  All three—Maass, Wiel, and 
Zobel—were attempting to defend riparian rights against others who 
sought to abolish those rights.  For Wiel, this entailed arguing that 
because riparian rights were derived from Roman law, they were vested 
property rights under Spanish–Mexican law before California became 
part of the United States.53  In the particular political context of the East, 
without a basis for referring to Roman law, Wiel’s California-based 
 
49. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Dual Systems, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra 
note 7, § 8.02(a)–(c) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Dual Systems] (describing the progression of 
the California, Colorado, and Oregon Doctrines, respectively). 
50. See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03. 
51. See generally 1 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 1–8, 
684–699 (3d ed. 1911) [hereinafter WIEL, WATER RIGHTS]; Wiel, French Authority, supra 
note 22, at 145–47; Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 247–53, 342–44; Samuel C. Wiel, Running 
Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. 190, 198–205 (1909); C.E. Busby, American Water Rights Law: A 
Brief Synopsis of Its Origin and Some of Its Broad Trends with Special Reference to the 
Beneficial Use of Water Resources, 5 S.C. L.Q. 106, 113–16 (1952). 
52. Arthur Maass & Hiller B. Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated 
the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 PUB. POL’Y 109, 109 (1960); see also Lauer, supra note 23, at 63–
72; Earl F. Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 103, 
103–04 (1957). 
53. The following discussion of Wiel relies on various works.  See WIEL, WATER 
RIGHTS, supra note 51, §§ 1–8, 684–699; Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 145–47; 
Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 247–53, 342–44; Wiel, Running Water, supra note 51, 198–205. 
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appeal to supposed Roman-law roots of riparian rights was antithetical 
to the continued survival of those rights.  
Wiel had no trouble in showing that Roman law considered the air, 
sea, seashore, and running water to be incapable of ownership except 
for limited usufructuary rights,54 and that the theory had been 
incorporated into the Napoleonic Code of 1804.55  To support his claim 
that no such rights were found in the pre-nineteenth century common 
law, Wiel placed his principal reliance on the fact that not until 1833 did 
English courts reject priority of use in favor of the common right of all 
riparian owners to the use of the flowing water and that English courts 
did so under the strong influence of American precedents.56 
Tracing French influence on Kent’s discussion of water law is fairly 
easy.57  No one, however, has shown direct evidence of French influence 
on Justice Story’s landmark opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson.  All Wiel 
 
54. Two court decisions have adopted the same reading of the sources of the riparian 
rights.  Portage Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. City of Akron, 846 N.E.2d 478, 490, 499 (2006); 
Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 762, 769 (1895).  Earl Murphy agreed that 
Roman law was the source of these notions in the common law, but he traced their 
introduction back to Bracton in the thirteenth century.  See Murphy, supra note 52, at 103–09; 
see also GETZLER, supra note 21, at 66–67; Lauer, supra note 23, at 65–72. 
55. The CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 644–45 (Fr.) (John H. Crabb trans., 1995) provides as 
follows: 
 
 Article 644—One whose property borders running water, other than that which 
is declared a dependency of the public domain by Article 538 in the Title 
Differentiation of Property, may use it on its passage for the irrigation of his 
properties.   
 One whose heritage is crossed by such waters may also use it during the interval 
while it is running through, but with the responsibility of returning it, upon leaving 
his lands, to its ordinary course. 
 Article 645—If a dispute arises among owners to whom such waters may be 
useful, the courts, in deciding, should reconcile the interest of agriculture with the 
respect due to ownership; and, in all cases, particular and local rules on waters and 
use of waters should be observed. 
Id.; see also A.N. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian 
Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L. REV. 697, 698 n.9 (1960–1961).  Not everyone 
agrees that this was the correct understanding of Roman law of water allocation in ancient 
times.  See Scott & Coustalin, supra note 26, at 833–37 (arguing that Roman law was actually 
based on the protection of uses ranked according to temporal priority rather than the 
principle of common ownership). This is an example of their anachronistic reading of 
historical materials to fit their theory. 
56. See Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 248–49. 
57. See generally 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 344–62 (1828); 
Busby, supra note 51; Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 134–39; Wiel, Origin, supra 
note 28, at 247–52. 
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could rely on was evidence of the general influence of French law in an 
Anglophobic America in the first half of the nineteenth century.58 
Wiel was not unaware of Merritt v. Parker.  He sought to dismiss the 
case, first by asserting that it was atypical of contemporaneous decisions 
in other states,59 and second by observing that the “antecedents of the 
New Jersey expression do not appear.”60  Wiel did assert that other 
sources suggested French and other antecedents, but he made no 
attempt to demonstrate how the further authorities he discussed 
(particularly French law adopted after Merritt v. Parker was decided—to 
which Wiel gave his most extended attention) could have related to 
Merritt.  Merritt, in fact, was far too typical of both English and 
American decisions of the time in at least one important aspect: The 
early opinions contained no clear or coherent theory of rights to use 
water, but instead an amalgam of concerns from which one can trace the 
natural flow theory, the reasonable use theory, and the prior 
appropriation theory, not to mention prescriptive rights.61  Yet, the 
major emphasis in Merritt, at least, seemed to be on a natural flow 
concept of riparian rights62—a decade before adoption of the 
Napoleonic Code that Wiel saw as the source of riparian rights in the 
common law and a full three decades before Justice Story’s widely-
hailed opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson.  Wiel did acknowledge that Story 
drew from the work of Joseph Angell in Tyler,63 but he ignored that 
 
58. See Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 251; Roscoe Pound, The Influence of French Law 
in America, 3 ILL. L. REV. 354, 355, 360–61 & n.29 (1909). 
59. Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 140–41.  But see the cases cited supra at 
note 45. 
60. Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 141. 
61. See, e.g., Hughes v. Mung, 3 H. & McH. 441, 442 (Md. 1796); King v. Tarlton, 2 H. & 
McH. 473, 473, 476 (Md. 1790); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 313–14, 320–21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1805); Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 501, 501 (1797); Deberry’s Case, 2 N.C. (1 
Hayw.) 248, 248 (1795); Beissell v. Sholl, 4 Dall. 211, 211 (Pa. 1800); Wright v. Cooper, 1 Tyl. 
425, 425–27 (Vt. 1802).  The paths taken by respective courts varied wildly: 
 
[T]he British courts floundered for a doctrinal basis to settle the increasingly 
frequent disputes over waterpower and were unable to settle on either ancient 
usage or prior occupancy or some combined doctrine. . . .  [L]ike the British courts, 
the Massachusetts courts eventually veered away from the individually defined 
rights of occupancy, [but] instead adopted the looser, group-oriented correlative-
rights/reasonable-use doctrine of the riparian system. 
Rose, supra note 22, at 277. 
62. See Merritt v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460, 462–65 (1795). 
63. Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 248–49. 
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Angell had relied on Merritt v. Parker.64  This, in itself, should have been 
enough to discredit the idea that Story, at least, was relying on the Code 
Napoléon of 1804 as Wiel was arguing—Chief Justice Kinsey had 
instructed the jury nearly a decade before the Code Napoléon was 
enacted. 
In contrast to Wiel, Maass and Zobel stressed the recognition in 
English law in the seventeenth century of a distinction between 
easements in land and natural rights in a watercourse—the latter 
entitling riparian landowners to an uninterrupted flow notwithstanding 
granted or prescriptive rights in other users.65  They found such English 
decisions even during the period in which Wiel claimed the English 
courts were following Blackstone’s theory of appropriation.66  Wiel, they 
concluded, had simply misunderstood Blackstone and the English 
courts’ application of nuisance theory to water disputes, particularly by 
reading back into these early sources and into Story’s opinion, 
anachronistic meanings of the words “appropriate” and “riparian.”67  In 
a sense, Maass and Zobel won this debate: Today, American courts, 
even in appropriative rights states, generally endorse the proposition 
that riparian rights formed the common law of England.68  While Wiel’s 
theory of a French origin for riparian rights continues to have its 
supporters, it no longer seems sustainable.  Rather, the best view of the 
question was summed up by Ludwik Teclaff, who concluded that 
“[m]ost likely, the riparian doctrine or its ingredients came to the United 
States as part and parcel of the common law, and the French influence 
was merely incidental, helping to give it a more precise legal 
expression.”69 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF TRADITIONAL RIPARIAN RIGHTS: 
ONE DOCTRINE OR TWO? 
By the early nineteenth century, the common law had evolved into 
 
64. ANGELL, supra note 46, at 5. 
65. See, e.g., Sury v. Pigot, (1625) 79 Eng. Rep. 1263 (K.B.) 1267–68.  Some would trace 
the presence of these theories all the way back to Bracton in the thirteenth century.  See supra 
note 55 and accompanying text. 
66. See, e.g., Wright v. Howard, (1823) 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (Ch.) 78–79; 1 Sim. & St. 190; 
Bealey v. Shaw, (1805) 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (K.B.) 1268–69; 6 East 207. 
67. See Maass & Zobel, supra note 52. 
68. See, e.g., State v. Superior Ct., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 280 (2000). 
69. LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
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something recognizable: the doctrine of riparian rights, namely, that 
landowners have a right to use water drawn from a body of water that 
flows or lies on their land that the law will protect, to some extent, from 
interference by others.70  American courts have struggled ever since to 
give a more precise formulation to this doctrine.  In the course of this 
struggle, the doctrine has evolved considerably from the confused and 
uncertain notions embodied in the earliest cases.  In this Part, I address 
that evolution. 
Chief Justice James Kinsey’s jury instructions in Merritt v. Parker71 
seemed to embrace the theory that riparian rights protect the right to 
receive the natural flow of a stream or other body of water.  It is by no 
means clear, however, that such a theory was ever actually applied in the 
case.  For one thing, we do not actually know how the jury decided the 
case after receiving Kinsey’s instructions.  More importantly, Kinsey 
also referred to the reasonableness of the parties’ behavior and the fact 
that the defendant had “appropriated” the water to his needs.72  The 
suggestion that temporal priority might be relevant to litigation over 
riparian rights rapidly disappeared from the ensuing cases.73  In other 
respects, Kinsey’s apparent confusion in Merritt, expressing a “natural 
flow” theory of riparian rights but then invoking a concept of 
reasonableness to moderate or replace the natural flow theory, rapidly 
became, and in some states continues to be, the norm in riparian rights 
litigation.74  Still, the received wisdom is that courts originally applied 
riparian rights as a rather rigid theory of protecting natural flows—a 
theory that allowed a riparian landowner to enjoin any water uses that 
materially altered the quantity or quality of the natural flow without 
proof of actual injury75—and then shifted to a “reasonable use” theory 
 
70. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
71. 1 N.J.L. 460, 463 (1795).  The relevant language is quoted supra at note 36. 
72. Id. at 465–66. The relevant language is quoted supra at note 42. 
73. See Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water, supra note 9, § 7.03(d). 
74. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 473 (D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Ulbricht 
v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Miller, 3 A. 780, 781–82 (Pa. 
1886); Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 519–20 (1871); Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848).  
For modern examples of the confusion over which doctrine applies, see In re Flood Litig., 607 
S.E.2d 863, 870–71, 874–76 & n.11 (W. Va. 2004); Stewart v. Bridges, 292 S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ga. 
1982); Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729, 733–34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).  For English 
law, see Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch.) 585; 6 Exch. 353. 
75. See Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys’ Sch., 103 N.E. 87, 89 (Mass. 1913) (suggesting in 
dictum that, in the context of an improper diversion of water, “[the lower court] would have 
permitted the recovery of nominal damages in any event, quite apart from the possibility of 
real injury to the plaintiff”). 
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that balanced competing uses against each other to determine which use 
was more socially beneficial.76  If this is so, this change resulted in the 
replacement of a theory that seemed to define clear private property 
rights by a theory of common property rights.77 
More than forty years ago, biologist Garrett Hardin explained in his 
famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons,78 why a common property 
system can function only when the common pool resource is available in 
much greater supply than the demand for the resource and why, when 
that condition is not met, the common property system either gives way 
to a private property regime or the resource will be destroyed.79  This is 
 
76. See, e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 48, § 3:12; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal 
Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 
61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 238 (2011); Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust 
Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 416–18; David N. 
Cassuto & Rômulo S. R. Sampaio, Water Law in the United States and Brazil—Climate 
Change & Two Approaches to Emerging Water Poverty, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 371, 379–80 (2011); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ 
Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological 
Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 57 (2010); Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & 
Richard Hamann, Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 
442–43 (2009); Dan Tarlock, How Well Can Water Law Adapt to the Potential Stresses of 
Global Climate Change?, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2010). 
77.  See generally Rose, supra note 22.  For a brief discussion of the different types of 
property in water, see supra Part I.  For a more detailed discussion, see Dellapenna, The Right 
to Consume Water, supra note 9, § 6.01(b)(1). 
78. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–44, 1248 
(1968).  
79. Id. at 1244, 1248.  Hardin explains that “ruin” is inevitable when the rational private 
party acts according to an unregulated commons: 
 
 Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman 
concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal 
to his herd.  And another; and another. . . .  But this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit—in a world that is limited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons.  Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 
Id. at 1244. 
 For further discussion of the tragedy, and discussions of the tragedy in different contexts, 
see GLENN G. STEVENSON, COMMON PROPERTY ECONOMICS: A GENERAL THEORY AND 
LAND USE APPLICATIONS 10–31 (1991) (comparing the economics-based open access theory 
to common property); Ronen Avraham & K.A.D. Camara, The Tragedy of the Human 
Commons, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 479–85 (2007); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11, 38–45 (2003) 
(describing antiproperty theory in the context of the commons); Brigham Daniels, Emerging 
Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 516–22 (2007); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott 
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more than a mere theoretical model.  The tragedy of the commons has 
happened, precisely as Hardin predicted, for fish in the sea, national 
park access, and even national treasuries (to name just a few 
examples).80  Hardin argued that a private property system, in which the 
costs as well as the benefits of resource management decisions are 
concentrated on the particular owner who makes the decision, was the 
only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons.81  He largely ignored the 
possibility of community management (public property, if you will) as 
an alternative possibility to privatizing the “commons.”82 
 
R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190 (2005) (analogizing Hardin’s herders example to global use of the 
atmosphere); Christopher L. Lant, J.B. Ruhl & Steven E. Kraft, The Tragedy of Ecosystem 
Services, 58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 969–70 (2008); Gary D. Libecap, Open-Access Losses and 
Delay in the Assignment of Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 379, 382–83 (2008); James L. 
Olmsted, Paradoxical Conservation and the Tragedy of Multiple Commons, 22 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 103, 104–05 (2008) (recognizing that Hardin’s essay moved the tragedy into the 
mainstream); and Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 114–19 (2009).  See generally Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the 
Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533 (2007); 
Symposium, Constructing Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010).  “The tragedy 
. . . refers to the social and economic consequences of allowing individuals free and unlimited 
access to some form of commons,” and water is an obvious example.  Olmsted, supra, at 104–
05. 
80. See generally ALEXANDER GARVIN ET AL., URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 
(1997); JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
NATIONAL PARKS (1980); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public 
Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Jaye Ellis, Fisheries 
Conservation in an Anarchical System: A Comparison of Rational Choice and Constructivist 
Perspectives, 3 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1 (2007); Rodney D. Fort & John Baden, The Federal 
Treasury as a Common Pool Resource and the Development of a Predatory Bureaucracy, in 
BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 9 (John Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981); Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The 
International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White Whale of Preservationism, 33 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2009); Andrew Serdy, Accounting for Catch in 
Internationally Managed Fisheries: What Role for State Responsibility?, 15 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. 23 (2010); Carl Tobias, The Tragedy of the Commons: The Case of the Blue 
Crab, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 73 (2009); Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights 
Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511 (2008). 
81. See Hardin, supra note 78, at 1245–48. 
82. See id. at 1248.  For varying discussions of the possibility of community management, 
see Johan Colding & Carl Folke, The Taboo System: Lessons About Informal Institutions for 
Nature Management, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 413 (2000); Dellapenna, Global Climate 
Disruption, supra note 2, at 426; Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 16, 
§ 6.01(b)(1); Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.01; Tine de Moor, 
Avoiding Tragedies: A Flemish Common and Its Commoners Under the Pressure of Social and 
Economic Change During the Eighteenth Century, 62 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (2009); Gregg W. 
Kettles, Formal Versus Informal Allocation of Land in a Commons: The Case of MacArthur 
Park Sidewalk Vendors, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 49 (2006); Henry E. Smith, Governing 
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If, like Hardin, one limits legal options to common property and 
private property, private property seems so superior to common 
property as a resource management system that one is left wondering 
how the current riparian-rights common property system came to be 
substituted for the earlier private property version of riparian rights.83  
The supposed earlier version of riparian rights—the natural flow 
theory—was as clear and certain a system of property as one could 
imagine: Apart from domestic uses, each riparian owner arguably had 
an unqualified right to have the water flow down undiminished in 
quality or quantity and to use that water only as long as no lower 
riparian’s right was affected.84  If in the mid- to late-nineteenth century 
the modern “reasonable use” theory replaced the natural flow theory,85 
then a private property system was abandoned in favor of a common 
property system.86  That change, if it occurred, demands an explanation.  
Similarly, explanation is demanded by comparable changes now 
seemingly underway for diffused surface water and groundwater.87 
 
Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008); and Martin 
S. Weinstein, Pieces of the Puzzle: Solutions for Community-Based Fisheries Management 
from Native Canadians, Japanese Cooperatives, and Common Property Researchers, 12 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114 
YALE L.J. 991 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 
(2003); and KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, 
THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM (2002)). 
 Elinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics for her work on Hardin’s neglect of 
the public or community property approach to resource management.  For examples of 
Ostrom’s work, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); and ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, 
GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994). 
83. CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 163–96 (1994); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 26, at 860–98. 
For related, but distinct, examples of what can happen when property rights are 
dysfunctional, see Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); and James M. Buchanan & 
Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000).  
84. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys’ Sch., 103 N.E. 87, 89 (Mass. 1913) (dictum). 
85. See the authorities collected supra at note 76. 
86. See Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, at 430. 
87. See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 531–35 (Cal. 1966) (explaining the rules 
governing diffused surface waters); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 862, 865–68 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1971) (discussing and revising the rules governing groundwater); State v. Michels 
Pipeline Constr. Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 343–45, 350–51 (1974).  For arguments for such a 
transition in a totally different context, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The 
Evolution of Private and Open Access Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 77–78 
(2009); and Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶¶ 20–31. 
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As will appear shortly, I am one who concludes that the 
reasonableness standard has always been applied to riparian rights and 
that, despite occasional dicta to the contrary, no common law court has 
ever actually applied the natural flow theory of riparian rights.88  If I am 
wrong, the fact that the law of water resources underwent a transition 
from private property to common property would suggest that, despite 
the asserted advantages of private property systems, such systems do not 
work well for ambulatory resources like water.89  If I am right, the 
question becomes, “Why do so many commentators accept the reality of 
such an apparently wrong-headed change?”  Such transitions in history 
are rare, to say the least, and seem counterproductive at best.90 
Some legal historians have noted this supposed transition and have 
attempted to explain it.  The largest group, led by Morton Horwitz, not 
only thought that a transition from natural flow to reasonable use 
occurred, but regarded the transition as a primary example of 
nineteenth century American courts devising means to introduce 
flexible development into a capital-poor and technologically-backward, 
but resource-rich, America.91  Eric Freyfogle gave a different twist to the 
transition, describing the transition as from a judicial focus on “water 
 
88. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water, supra note 9, §§ 7.01(b), .02(c). 
89. See Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, at 425–35; Dellapenna, 
The Importance of Getting Names Right, supra note 13, at 375–76; Dellapenna, Introduction to 
Riparian Rights, supra note 16, § 6.01(b)(1)–(3). 
90. But see Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The 
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 998–99 (2006) (arguing that 
“open access” (common property) systems evolve in many different settings even in the face 
of private property regimes). 
91. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 34–54 (1977); Robert H. Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An 
Instrumentalist Theory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1381, 1391–1400 (1989); Denis J. Brion, 
The Common Law of Waterpower in New England, 5 VT. L. REV. 201, 208–10 (1980); 
E.P. Krauss, The Legal Form of Liberalism: A Study of Riparian and Nuisance Law in 
Nineteenth Century Ohio, 18 AKRON L. REV. 223, 226, 228–30 (1984); Rose, supra note 22, at 
277–88; Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (1981); Stephen F. Williams, Transforming 
American Law: Doubtful Economics Makes Doubtful History, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1197–
1200 (1978) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860 (1977)).  For general critiques of Horwitz’s history, see Robert W. Gordon, 
Morton Horwitz and His Critics: A Conflict of Narratives, 37 TULSA L. REV. 915 (2002); 
James L. Huffman, American Legal History According to Horwitz: The Rule of Law Yields to 
Power, 37 TULSA L. REV. 953 (2002); Nancy Isenberg, Laissez-Unfaire: Gender and the 
Political Manipulation of the Common Law in Antebellum America, 37 TULSA L. REV. 929 
(2002); and Jenny B. Wahl, Twice-Told Tales: An Economist’s Re-Telling of the 
Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, 37 TULSA L. REV. 879 (2002). 
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rights” to a judicial focus on “water wrongs”92—meaning, a shift from a 
property rights analysis to a tort analysis.93  Some commentators have 
seen the transition as reflecting recognition that the economy had 
evolved into a stage of high transaction costs, displacing an earlier 
period of low transaction costs.94 
Apart perhaps from Freyfogle, the several explanations focus on the 
economics of the situation to justify the transition to common property.  
Focusing on the economics appears reasonable because the argument in 
favor of private property (“the tragedy of the commons”) is an 
argument about economic incentives.95  And, it turns out there is some 
evidence of attention to economics in the judicial opinions that mark the 
supposed transition.96  Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in Tyler v. 
Wilkinson,97 which introduced the term “riparian” into American law, 
appears to be an economically purposive intervention in the developing 
law with its extended discussion of the need to make valuable uses of 
water resources98 and its presumption of a lost grant from the necessities 
of encouraging investment.99 
Direct evidence of such purposive intervention apparently is 
provided by another decision from 1827, the same year that Tyler v. 
Wilkinson was decided.  In Martin v. Bigelow,100 the Vermont Supreme 
Court found that “our circumstances,” evidently meaning the need to 
develop the economy, required the rejection of the protection of prior 
uses.  Only later did the Vermont Supreme Court rely on Tyler v. 
 
92. Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 499–508.  
93. See Braverman v. Eicher, 238 N.W.2d 331, 335, 337 (Iowa 1976); Keys v. Romley, 412 
P.2d 529, 535 (Cal. 1966) (describing the traditional natural servitude theory of diffused 
surface waters as a rule of property, and the new approach of reasonable use as a rule of tort); 
Freyfogle, supra note 92, at 499–509; Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law 
Burdens of Modern Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 489–91, 513–16 (1986). 
94. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 20–21 (1985); Rose, supra note 22, at 285–93; Williams, supra 
note 91, at 1197–99. 
95. See Hardin, supra note 78, at 1244–47. 
96. For a strong argument that courts know too little about the effects of their decisions 
to ever be guided by the supposed social consequences, see Richard A. Epstein, The Social 
Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982).  Of course, just 
because courts might be unwise to attempt such interventions does not mean that courts do 
not attempt them. 
97. 24 F. Cas. 472, 473 (D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). 
98. Id. at 474. 
99. Id. at 474–76. 
100. 2 Aik. 184, 187 (Vt. 1827); see also Cary v. Daniels, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466, 476–77 
(1844) (adopting reasonable use based, in part, on economic grounds). 
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Wilkinson for the same proposition.101 
Yet, upon careful reading, Justice Story’s opinion actually throws 
doubt on whether there ever was a natural flow theory of riparian rights 
applied in the United States.  While courts and scholars often identify 
Story’s opinion as the introduction of the reasonable use theory into 
American law,102 others also cite that opinion as the source of the natural 
flow theory.103  The opinion is worth quoting at length to illustrate why it 
is cited in support of both theories: 
 
 Prima facie every proprietor upon each bank of a river is 
entitled to the land, covered with water, in front of his bank, to 
the middle of the thread of the stream . . . .  In virtue of this 
ownership he has a right to the use of the water flowing over in 
its natural current, without diminution or obstruction.  But, 
strictly speaking, he has no property in the water itself; but a 
simple use of it, while it passes along.  The consequence of this 
principle is, that no proprietor has a right to use the water to the 
prejudice of another.  It is wholly immaterial, whether the party 
be a proprietor above or below, in the course of the river; the 
right being common to all the proprietors on the river, no one 
has a right to diminish the quantity which will, according to the 
natural current, flow to a proprietor below, or to throw it back 
upon a proprietor above.  This is the necessary result of the 
perfect equality of right among all the proprietors of that, which 
is common to all.  The natural stream, existing by the bounty of 
Providence for the benefit of the land through which it flows, is 
an incident annexed, by operation of law, to the land itself.  
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be 
 
101. See Davis v. Fuller, 12 Vt. 178, 192 (1840). 
102. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan Cnty., 238 P.3d 1129, 1141 (Wash. 2010); Hope M. 
Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water Everywhere, 
Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203, 1208 n.24 (2006); Cassuto & 
Sampaio, supra note 76, at 379; Marla E. Mansfield, A Reexamination of the Temporal 
Dimension in Property and Takings, 44 TULSA L. REV. 765, 773–74 (2009); Nisha D. Noroian, 
Prior Appropriation, Agriculture and the West: Caught in a Bad Romance, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 
181, 191 (2011); Rose, supra note 22, at 286–87; Smith, supra note 82, at 452. 
103. See, e.g., Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1194 n.4 (Alaska 1973); McBryde Sugar 
Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1343–44 (Haw. 1973); Borough of Westville v. Whitney 
Home Builders, Inc., 122 A.2d 233, 240 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956); Stevens v. Spring 
Valley Water Works & Supply Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 503, 511 (App. Term 1964); Franco-Am. 
Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 574 n.26 (Okla. 1990); see also Kirt 
Mayland, Navigating the Murky Waters of Connecticut’s Water Allocation Scheme, 24 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 685, 700–01 (2006). 
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understood, as holding the doctrine, that there can be no 
diminution whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment 
whatsoever, by a riparian proprietor, in the use of the water as it 
flows; for that would be to deny any valuable use of it.  There 
may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is common to 
all, a reasonable use.  The true test of the principle and extent of 
the use is, whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or 
not.  There may be a diminution in quantity, or a retardation or 
acceleration of the natural current indispensable for the general 
and valuable use of the water, perfectly consistent with existence 
of the common right.  The diminution, retardation, or 
acceleration, not positively and sensibly injurious by diminishing 
the value of the common right, is an implied element in the right 
of using the stream at all.  The law here, as in many other cases, 
acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience and 
general good, and it is not betrayed into a narrow strictness, 
subversive of common sense, nor into an extravagant looseness, 
which would destroy private rights.  The maxim is applied, ‘Sic 
utere tuo, ut non alienum laedas.’104 
 
Did Story’s opinion actually mark a transition from a natural flow 
theory to a reasonable use theory? 
The dispute in Tyler v. Wilkinson was similar to Merritt v. Parker, 
involving this time a suit between mill owners over shares in the water 
of the Pawtucket River.105  The plaintiffs’ mills depended on a head of 
water created by a “lower dam” dating from 1718 that had replaced an 
even older dam.106  The defendants’ mills drew their water from 
“Sergeant’s Trench,” a ditch dating from 1714, along with related dams, 
gates, and flumes, some less than thirty years old at the time of the suit 
in 1827.107  The plaintiffs wanted to enlarge their water use with new or 
 
104. Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474.  Compare the language in Tyler to Chief Baron James 
Parke’s statement in Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch.) 585; 6 Exch. 353: 
 
 The right to have the stream to flow in its natural state without diminution or 
alteration is an incident to the property in the land through which it passes; but 
flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense that it is a bonum vacans, to which the 
first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is public and common in 
this sense only, that all may reasonably use it who have a right of access to it, that 
none can have any property in the water itself, except in the particular portion 
which he may choose to abstract from the stream and take into his possession . . . . 
105. Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 473. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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improved mills.108  The plaintiffs claimed that the mills along Sergeant’s 
Trench were not riparian; therefore those taking water from the trench 
were only entitled to use “surplus water”—that is, water left over after 
the riparian owners satisfied their wants.109  The owners of Sergeant’s 
Trench, on the other hand, claimed that they had appropriated to 
themselves the full capacity of the trench even if they did not use the 
water.110  Story rejected both claims in the foregoing paragraph—one of 
the most quoted passages regarding riparian rights.  His extended 
discussion, however, did not resolve the dispute before him. 
The defendants, mill owners along Sergeant’s Trench, were not 
riparians because the trench was not a natural stream; as such, they 
could have no right to water under Justice Story’s theory.  Story went on 
to hold that the defendants were entitled to their customary usage 
through the trench, both because of an express grant accepted by the 
plaintiffs111 and because of a presumed grant derived from more than 
twenty years of adverse use preempting any use by the plaintiffs.112  In 
the course of this discussion, Justice Story, three times, expressly 
rejected the claim that mere priority of use, neither authorized by grant 
nor coupled with long-continued adverse use, would in any way affect 
the rights of riparian owners.113  Finally, he concluded ambiguously that 
in the event the water proved inadequate for all the mills, the deficiency 
“must be borne by all parties, as a common loss, wherever it may fall, 
according to existing rights.”114 
In fact, all the early cases expressed both theories described as 
riparian rights (natural flow and reasonable use).115  So did James Kent’s 
Commentaries,116 which Sam Wiel and C.E. Busby thought of as, along 
 
108. Id. at 473, 474–77. 
109. Id. at 473. 
110. See id. at 475, 477 (addressing arguments that there is a presumption of an 
“absolute and controlling power” to the water from the trench and that the agreement by the 
parties addresses a right to water flowing in the trench, not the quantity needed by the mills). 
111. Id. at 474, 478. 
112. Id. at 474–76. 
113. Id. at 474, 475, 477. 
114. Id. at 478. 
115. See, e.g., Ulbricht v. Eufaula Water Co., 6 So. 78, 79 (Ala. 1889); Pa. R.R. Co. v. 
Miller, 3 A. 780, 781–82 (Pa. 1886); Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 519–20 (1871); Hendrick v. 
Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848).  For the similar confusion in English law, see Embrey v. Owen, 
(1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch.) 585; 6 Exch. 353. 
116. See Kent, supra note 57, at 356; see also Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. 307, 320–21 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (a Kent opinion). 
10 - DELLAPENNA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:29 PM 
74 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:53 
with Tyler, the fount of riparian rights theory.117  Only Ted Lauer, 
Anthony Scott, and Georgina Coustalin have concluded from these 
mixed expressions that common law riparian rights were based on the 
reasonableness of the use.118 
A belated confirmation of Horwitz’s premise, however, might be 
found in a line of cases upholding the natural flow theory, but only 
against public entities.119  In these cases, the public entities altered the 
natural flow by actions ranging from outright diversion of the water to 
allow the construction of highways to increasing the flow through the 
draining of sewage through a natural channel—yet, the private riparian 
owners along the stream were not making consumptive use of the water 
and therefore could prove little or no pecuniary losses.  The courts 
allowed recovery for the taking of private property but denied an 
injunction, generally through a balancing of the equities in favor of the 
public activity.120  When a court indicates that it would award damages 
while refusing an injunction for the interference with the natural flow by 
public action, the court simply casts the costs of the public action on the 
entire community, consistent with one of the major premises of takings 
theory.121  Yet, even this may be illusory.  After all, the plaintiffs asked 
for injunctions because damages would have been difficult or impossible 
to prove.  When a competing consumptive use is private, it becomes 
more difficult for a court to deny an injunction through a balancing of 
the equities,122 while to award damages against a private actor itself will 
frequently be enough to bar the consumptive use in favor of a non-
 
117. Busby, supra note 51, at 113–16; Wiel, French Authority, supra note 22, at 134–39; 
Wiel, Origin, supra note 28, at 247–52. 
118. Lauer, supra note 23, at 60–61; Scott & Coustalin, supra note 26, at 887–98. 
119. Snyder v. Callaghan, 284 S.E.2d 241, 247 (W. Va. 1981); Bd. of Transp. v. Terminal 
Warehouse Corp., 268 S.E.2d 180, 183–85 (N.C. 1980); Dimmock v. City of New London, 245 
A.2d 569, 570, 572 (Conn. 1968); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 828, 831 
(Conn. 1967); Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Vill. of Green Valley, 387 N.E.2d 422, 425, 426 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979). 
120. See, e.g., Dimmock, 245 A.2d at 574 (recognizing that the private plaintiff could sue 
for damages and allowing the municipal defendant a reasonable time to acquire the plaintiff’s 
water rights through eminent domain); Terminal Warehouse, 268 S.E.2d. at 184 (stating that 
damages is the proper remedy against a public entity). 
121. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827–842 (1987). See 
generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, 
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
122. At least some early decisions did not consider the possibility.  See, e.g., Clinton v. 
Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 521 (1871); Hendrick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 260–65 (1848). 
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consumptive use (or perhaps even total nonuse).123  In such a case, 
courts simply fall back on the reasonable use theory and find that there 
has been no invasion by the preferred consumptive user.  When an 
injunction is denied against a public user through the balancing of the 
equities even though no damages can be proven, the court has adopted 
the functional equivalent of the reasonable use rule in this situation as 
well. 
IV.  AN ASIDE: THE EMERGENCE OF APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS124 
Hardin focused on the likelihood of overexploitation of a common 
pool resource.125  Our experience with riparian rights suggests another 
feature of common pool resources: If exploitation of a common pool 
resource requires significant capital investment, the inability of potential 
investors to keep others from preempting an investor’s uses will bring 
about underinvestment in the resource.126  This fear was a major cause of 
the rejection of riparian rights in the drier western states.127  Wendy 
Wagner has identified another drawback of common property systems: 
the incentive to hide the failings of the system for fear that the 
dissemination of such knowledge might provoke the regulation or 
privatization of the commons.128  The suppression of relevant knowledge 
 
123. That this line of argument struck the reporters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
as unjust hardly disproves that courts took this approach.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 850A app., cmt. l (1982).  On the unreliability of the Restatement (Second) as applied 
to riparian rights, see Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 16, § 6.01(c). 
124. Part III has been adapted, in large part, from Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra 
note 49, § 8.02(a)–(c). 
125. See Hardin, supra note 78, 1243–44, 1248. 
126. See, e.g., Rowland v. Ramelli, 599 P.2d 656, 666–67 (Cal. 1979) (en banc); RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 67–70 (1995); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 910–912 (2004); J.W. Milliman, Water 
Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J.L. & ECON. 41, 47–51 (1959); Carol Rose, 
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 711, 711–14 (1986) (“No one wishes to invest in something that may be taken 
away from him tomorrow . . . .”).  For a serious challenge to this assumption, see Harrison C. 
Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB. L. REV. 76, 84–
85 (1987). 
127. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446–47 (1882); see also James 
N. Corbridge, Jr., Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A Challenge for 
Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 527–29 (1998); Norman K. Johnson & 
Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western Water Law in Response to 
Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 351 (1989).  
128. Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1636–41, 
1745 (2004). 
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could be even more damaging than the risks of deliberate 
overexploitation or underinvestment. 
For the foregoing reasons, traditional riparian rights proved 
unsuitable to the drier lands west of Kansas City.  From the earliest 
years of “Anglo” (English-speaking American) settlement, the 
newcomers generally displaced aboriginal and Spanish–Mexican law.129  
Because of aridity in the West, the new courts there confronted 
increasing demands to divert water for mining, irrigation, industrial, and 
municipal uses that could not be resolved satisfactorily even through 
recourse to the reasonable use theory.130  Yet no one seems to have 
asked whether the land was adapted to the sort of use patterns the 
European-American settlers were bringing.  In particular, no one seems 
to have challenged the goal of “making the desert bloom.”  Experience, 
 
129. The few apparent survivals of Spanish–Mexican law seem actually to have been 
fictions invented by common law judges.  See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 
537 P.2d 1250, 1265–67, 1274–77 (Cal. 1975); State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89 
P.3d 47, 51–52, 55–56 (N.M. 2004).  See generally NORRIS HUNDLEY JR., THE GREAT 
THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770S–1990S 13–77 (1992); DONALD J. PISANI, TO 
RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1848–1902, at 38–46 (1992) 
[hereinafter PISANI, RECLAIM]; DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO RIGHTS 
DOCTRINE: WATER ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MEXICO (1990); Peter L. Reich, 
The “Hispanic” Roots of Prior Appropriation in Arizona, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 649 (1995); Peter 
L. Reich, Mission Revival Jurisprudence: State Courts and Hispanic Water Law Since 1850, 69 
WASH. L. REV. 869 (1994); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of 
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 394–400 (2005).  The 
Spanish and the Mexicans were just as intent on disregarding aboriginal practices and legal 
customs as Anglos were intent on displacing Spanish–Mexican Law.  See HUNDLEY, supra, at 
25–26; Kate A. Berry, Water Use and Cultural Conflict in 19th Century Northwestern New 
Spain and Mexico, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 759, 761–62 (2000); Guadalupe T. Luna, Gold, 
Souls, and Wandering Clerics: California Missions, Native Californians, and LatCrit Theory, 
33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 921, 926–28 (2000); C. Luther Propst & Peter W. Culp, Searching for 
Cíbola: Community-Based Environmental Restoration in the Colorado River Watershed, 42 
ARIZ. L. REV. 259, 261–62 (2000).  Even today, when Indian water rights are in issue, courts 
ignore the customary law of the tribes.  See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation 
v. United States, 964 F.2d 1102, 1102–17 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
130. For brief analyses of how geography shapes water law in different states, see 
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 81–83 (1967); DONALD J. 
PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS: THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE IN 
CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1931, at 1–2, 37–39 (1984) [hereinafter PISANI, FROM 
THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS]; WORSTER, supra note 2, at 3; Gordon Morris 
Bakken, The Influence of the West on the Development of Law, 24 J.W. 66, 66–67 (1985); 
Robert G. Dunbar, The Adaptability of Water Law to the Aridity of the West, 24 J.W. 57, 57–
58 (1985); Grossfeld, supra note 2 at 1514; and Tom I. Romero, II, Uncertain Waters and 
Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of Colorado’s Legal Past, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 
532–44 (2002). 
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however, has now taught us that “drought follows the plow.”131  Only 
recently have major actors in western water management begun to 
question whether there is a need for basic rethinking regarding the 
appropriative rights regime.132 
The initial development of appropriative rights was not based on 
such sophisticated theories of water law or management.  That would 
come only later.  Large-scale Anglo settlement reached California 
before the other states west of Kansas City, except Oregon and Texas, 
and the peculiarities of settlement in California compelled people there 
to confront problems of allocating water to consumptive uses long 
before people in Oregon and Texas.133  Anglo settlement in Oregon and 
Texas at first was predominantly in humid areas where riparian rights 
worked well.134  The Anglo settlement pattern in California was radically 
different.  The discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill, California, less than six 
months before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo came into effect and 
transferred vast western tracts (including California) from Mexico to the 
United States, set off a massive gold rush that raised California’s non-
aboriginal population from a few thousand to over 100,000 in less than a 
year, and to several hundred thousand within five years.135  These people 
settled mostly in the mountains where the gold was, with little concern 
for the agricultural potential of the land.136  This sudden peopling of 
 
131. Michael H. Glantz, Introduction to DROUGHT FOLLOWS THE PLOW: CULTIVATING 
MARGINAL AREAS 1, 1–4 (Michael H. Glantz ed., 1994). 
132. See COMM. W. WATER MGMT. ET AL., WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1–2 (1992); Eric L. Garner & Janice L. Weis, 
Water Management Options for the Future, in THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW MANUAL 
330, 330–34, 339–40 (Richard J. Fink ed., 1995); Kara Gillon, Watershed Down?: The Ups and 
Downs of Watershed Management in the Southwest, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 395, 395–98 
(2002); Helen Ingram, Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Coping with Future 
Scarcity, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 179, 182–84 (1999); Lora A. Lucero, Water and the 
Disconnects in Growth Management, 31 URB. LAW. 871, 874–75 (1999); Charles Wilkinson, 
Western Water: The Ethical and Spiritual Questions, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 367, 368 (2002).  
133. See HUNDLEY, supra note 129, at 63–82; PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, at 14–
26.  I discuss the evolution of water rights in California in some detail in Dellapenna, Dual 
Systems, supra note 49, § 8.02(a), and the evolution of water rights in Oregon and Texas (as 
well as several other states) in Dellapenna, supra, § 8.02(c). 
134. HUNDLEY, supra note 129, at 63–82; PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, at 14–26. 
135. See ROBERT F. HEIZER & ALAN J. ALMQUIST, THE OTHER CALIFORNIANS: 
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES TO 
1920, at 143–44 (1971); James J. Rawls, A Golden State: An Introduction, in A GOLDEN 
STATE: MINING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GOLD RUSH CALIFORNIA 1, 9 (James J. 
Rawls & Richard J. Orsi eds., 1999) 
136. See HUNDLEY, supra note 129, at 67; PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, 11–18; 
Lucien Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 443–
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California occurred without an organized government in place.137 
Whatever law might have been established among the Spanish-
founded missions, presidios, and pueblos was virtually swept away and 
ignored by the mass of would-be miners.138  Yet, the settlers did not 
consider themselves to be without law.  To a greater extent than is often 
appreciated, the Anglo settlers brought with them and used the only law 
with which they were familiar: the common law as found in the eastern 
United States.139  Regarding the two most centrally material factors in 
their lives (land and water), however, the settlers were unable to use 
that law.  Under the law brought from the eastern United States, the 
land belonged to the government and the waters went with the land.140  
The “forty-niners” were unable to acquire title to the land without the 
establishment of regular government and comprehensive surveys, but 
they were unwilling to wait for that process to occur.  The newcomers 
simply sought out the gold as trespassers and took what land and water 
they needed.141 
 
44 (1922). 
137. PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, at 12–14; see also CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, 
MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 105–64 (1884); L. Ward 
Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in the Priority States, 28 HARV. 
L. REV. 270, 272–73 (1915); Shaw, supra note 136, at 446. 
138. Statutes in several states, including California, sought to preserve Spanish–Mexican 
irrigation law, but such rights were always subordinated to the needs of miners.  See, e.g., 
GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
FRONTIER: CIVIL LAW AND SOCIETY, 1850–1912, at 33–36 (1983); BETTY EAKLE DOBKINS, 
THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 136–39 (1959); HOWARD ROBERTS LAMAR, 
THE FAR SOUTHWEST, 1846–1912: A TERRITORIAL HISTORY 91–92 (1966) (recognizing that 
California law may have been shaped to meet the needs of the Anglos); PISANI, FROM THE 
FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS, supra note 130, at 33–34; PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 
129, at 38–44 (noting that California and Colorado were states where Spanish and Mexican 
influences on water rights failed to survive); Hobbs, supra note 2, at 6–14 (outlining the water 
practices of the Puebloans, Hopi, and early Spanish explorers); Wells A. Hutchins, The 
Community Acequia: Its Origin and Development, 31 SW. HIST. Q. 261, 261–63 (1928). 
139. See PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, at 14; JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE 
ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL (1980) 
(rebutting the perception that the pioneers were lawless and pointing to the large role that the 
law and lawyers played in the pioneers’ lives); SHINN, supra note 137, at 120–31; Mark T. 
Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of the California Doctrine, 
1850–1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162–65 (1998); Edwin W. Young, The Adoption of the 
Common Law in California, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361–62 (1960). 
140. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 120, 133 (1845); United States v. 
Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 538 (1840).  Both of these cases held that lead in the ground 
went with the land.  Gear, 44 U.S. at 133; Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 538.  However, the Court’s 
analysis equally applies to other resources, including water. 
141. Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. 199, 210–11, 222–26 (1861). 
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The results of this culture of just taking what you needed helped to 
give Americans a national mythology based on stories that were all too 
true: violent disputes, blood feuds, and sudden death.  The miners 
quickly sought to bring order to their lives through “vigilance 
committees,” applying vigilante law based on the most elementary 
notion of justice: the first to grab it owns it, or, as it would be put more 
eloquently by lawyers and judges, “first in time, first in right.”142  Once 
the miners went beyond panning for gold and undertook placer mining, 
there emerged large mining companies that needed a great deal of 
water, often at a considerable removal from where the water was 
naturally located.143  This process was well established on the ground 
before effective formal governments could be created.  Those first 
governments could do little more than ratify the “customs of miners,” as 
was done in the first California Practice Act: 
 
In actions respecting “mining claims,” proof shall be admitted of 
the customs usages or regulations established and in force at the 
bar, or diggings, embracing such claim; and such customs, usages 
or regulations, when not in conflict with the Constitution and 
laws of this State, shall govern the decision of the action.144 
 
Justice Stephen Field, at one time Chief Justice of California, later 
would sum up the matter for the United States Supreme Court: “[T]he 
miners . . . were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon 
 
142. See, e.g., Fort Vannoy Irrig. Dist. v. Water Res. Comm’n, 188 P.3d 277, 283–84 (Or. 
2008) (en banc).  See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 129, at 67–73; PISANI, RECLAIM, supra 
note 129, at 14–31; Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study 
of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 168–69, 176–79 (1975); Kanazawa, supra note 136, 
at 165–68; John Umbeck, The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 
EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 197, 202–06, 215–18 (1977).  David Schorr has challenged the 
prevalent view that the mining camps were the source of appropriative rights, ignoring the 
inability to apply riparian rights in a context where nearly everyone was a trespasser.  See 
David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of 
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 11–33 (2005); David B. Schorr, The First Water 
Privatization Debate: Colorado Water Corporations in the Gilded Age, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 313, 
319–33 (2006). 
143. Donald Pisani has documented the rather considerable support that small mining 
operators gave to the riparian tradition in opposition to the increasing concentration of water 
in the hands of large, capital-intensive mining companies.  PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, 
at 23–26. 
144. Act of April 29, 1851, as amended by Act of May 18, 1854, ch. 5, 1854 Cal. Stat. 16, 
§ 621; see also HUNDLEY, supra note 129, at 73–74. 
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the public lands in the State.”145  The result is a certain irony because “a 
legal system that arose from the relatively lawless mining camps of the 
Wild West would come to be viewed as though it had been handed 
down directly from God.”146  The customs of the California miners were 
then carried across the West as the less successful miners chased the 
succeeding mineral rushes in what would become other states.147 
By 1882, courts in western states were giving more sophisticated 
rationales for adopting appropriative rights.148  If a court had embraced 
the natural flow theory of riparian rights, that would have foreclosed 
mining or irrigation on non-riparian lands in favor of the water flowing 
virtually unused and unusable (except perhaps for the last riparian 
before the water flows into the sea) across riparian land.149  The 
reasonable use theory, on the other hand, was too uncertain a basis for 
promoting investment (private or public) in the expensive works 
necessary for the diversion and use of water.150  As a result, the states 
most heavily dependent on mining and irrigated agriculture made two 
fundamental changes in their water law.  First, they utterly rejected 
riparian rights for consumptive uses.  Second, they subordinated non-
consumptive uses (to which riparian rights still applied) to consumptive 
uses.  This came to be known as the “Colorado doctrine,” named after 
the state whose courts first adopted these changes.151  Western states in 
which other livelihoods were significant received riparian rights partially 
 
145. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878). 
146. Reed D. Benson, A Few Ironies of Western Water Law, 6 WYO. L. REV. 331, 333 
(2006). 
147. For analysis of how each western state ended up with its current form of water law, 
see Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 49, § 8.02–.02(c). 
148. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (discussing why 
riparian rights would not be suitable to the drier states); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541, 542 
(Idaho 1890) (same); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 264–65 (Wyo. 1900) (same). 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 51 P. 674, 677–78 (N.M. 
1898); Reno Smelting, Milling & Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 318–19 (Nev. 
1889); Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290, 291 (Utah 1891); CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 152–55, 158, 186–87 (1894). 
150. See, e.g., Coffin, 6 Colo. at 446; Drake, 23 P. at 542; Farm Inv. Co., 61 P. at 260.  The 
classic description of the shortcomings of riparian rights is found in Mason Gaffney, 
Economic Aspects of Water Resources Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 131, 131–34 (1969); see 
also Nirav K. Desai, Up a Creek: An Introduction to the Commission’s Final Report 
Discussion of Uncertainty in California Water Rights Law, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 29, 33 
(2005); Romero, supra note 129, at 534–41; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty and 
Markets in Water Resources, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 117, 130 (2005).  For a challenge to this 
conclusion, see PISANI, RECLAIM, supra note 129, at 26–29. 
151. See Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 49, § 8.02(b). 
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or wholly into their law—but those states struggled thereafter to limit or 
eliminate those rights.152  The struggle ensured that such riparian rights 
as recognized in western states developed important differences from 
riparian rights in the eastern states.153  Riparian rights continue to have 
considerable importance in California, Texas, and Washington, leading 
to attempts to delimit riparian rights administratively.154  Riparian rights 
could also be valuable property rights in other dual system states, 
although in states like Oregon, with no application by a jurist or an 
administrator for decades, riparian rights are vestigial at best.155 
V.  THE EVOLUTION OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
Courts continued to struggle with the meaning and application of 
riparian rights throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Actual decisions, though, remained few and far between (either because 
there usually was enough water for all demands—at least if one ignored 
the need to maintain ecological flows—or because the outcome of 
litigation was simply too unpredictable under the reasonable use theory 
to justify the expense of litigation).  In part because of the rarity of 
precedents, courts continued to mingle natural flow language with 
reasonable use language, without any apparent awareness of the 
contradiction.156  Yet, when courts had to make a choice, they invariably 
chose the reasonable use theory—without, however, developing a clear 
set of criteria to determine which uses would be preferred when, as was 
nearly always the case, the multiple uses before the court were all 
reasonable in the abstract.157 
The reasonable use theory from the beginning allowed a great deal 
 
152. See id. §§ 8.02(a), .02(c), .03. 
153. See id. § 8.04. 
154. For cases in which the courts acknowledged an administrative agency’s ability to 
delimit riparian rights, see Rowland v. Ramelli, 599 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1979) (en banc); In re 
Brazos III Segment, 746 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. 1988); In re Upper Guadalupe Segment, 642 
S.W.2d 438, 446 (Tex. 1982); State v. Abbott, 694 P.2d 1071, 1074–75, 1077 (Wash. 1985) (en 
banc). 
155. See, e.g., Teel Irrig. Dist. v. Water Res. Dep’t, 898 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 
1995) (“Water rights in Oregon are based on appropriation for a beneficial use.”). 
156. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133–34 (Ark. 1955) (discussing Arkansas 
precedents embracing both the natural flow theory and the reasonable use theory); White v. 
Pa. R.R. Co., 47 A.2d 200, 202–04 (Pa. 1946) (applying the natural flow theory to water 
drainage); Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729, 733–34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) 
(applying a reasonableness theory to water drainage). 
157. See, e.g., Harris, 283 S.W.2d at 133–34. 
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of discretion in the court to decide which use was to be preferred.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court early on sought to develop more specific 
criteria and came up with the following: 
 
3.  The law does not lay down any fixed rules for 
determining what is a reasonable use of the water of a stream by 
a riparian owner.  What constitutes a reasonable use is not a 
question of law, but of fact, to be determined . . . from all the 
circumstances of the case. . . . 
4.  In determining what is a reasonable use, regard must be 
had to the subject-matter of the use; the occasion and manner of 
its application; the object, extent, necessity, and duration of the 
use; the nature and size of the stream; the kind of business to 
which it is subservient; the importance and necessity of the use 
claimed by one party, and the extent of the injury to the other 
party; the state of improvement of the country in regard to mills 
and machinery, and the use of water as a propelling power; the 
general and established usages of the country in similar cases; 
and all the other and ever-varying circumstances of each 
particular case bearing upon the questions of the fitness and 
propriety of the use of the water under consideration. 
5.  Evidence of uniform and general custom in like cases is 
competent, although, of course, not conclusive, upon the 
question of whether a use is a reasonable one.  Usage . . . is some 
proof of what is considered a reasonable and proper use of that 
which is a common right, because it affords evidence of the tacit 
consent of all parties interested to the general convenience or 
necessity of such use. . . .  [M]uch would depend on the character 
and size of the stream and the uses to which it is adapted. . . . 
6.  To these rules we think we may properly add another, 
viz.: Whenever it appears that any use of a stream by one 
riparian owner interferes with the reasonable use of the stream 
by a lower riparian owner, . . . [whether] by the interruption, 
diversion, obstruction, or pollution of the water, the burden of 
proof is upon the former to show that his use is reasonable, and 
the greater the injury is to the lower owner the greater necessity 
for such use must the upper owner show in order to establish its 
reasonableness.  The reasonableness of such use must determine 
the right, and this must depend in a great degree upon the extent 
of the detriment to the riparian proprietors below.158 
 
158. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 15 N.W. 167, 168–69 (Minn. 1883) (internal 
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Courts hardly made any progress beyond these vague criteria for at 
least a century.  A half-century later, the best the Restatement of Torts 
could add was its explanation that 
 
[t]he determination in a particular case of the unreasonableness 
of a particular use is not and should not be an unreasoned, 
intuitive conclusion on the part of a court or jury.  It is rather an 
evaluating of the conflicting interests of each of the contestants 
before the court in accordance with the standards of society, and 
a weighing of those, one against the other.  The law accords 
equal protection to the interests of all the riparian proprietors in 
the use of water, and seeks to promote the greatest beneficial use 
of the water, and seeks to promote the greatest beneficial use by 
each with a minimum of harm to others.  But when one riparian 
proprietor’s use of the water harmfully invades another’s interest 
in its use, there is an incompatibility of interest between the two 
parties to a greater or lesser extent depending on the extent of 
the invasion, and there is immediately a question whether such a 
use is legally permissible.  It is axiomatic in the law that 
individuals in society must put up with a reasonable amount of 
annoyance and inconvenience resulting from the otherwise 
lawful activities of their neighbors in the use of their land.  
Hence it is only when one riparian proprietor’s use of the water 
is unreasonable that another who is harmed by it can complain, 
even though the harm is intentional.  Substantial intentional 
harm to another cannot be justified as reasonable unless the legal 
merit or utility of the activity which produces it outweighs the 
legal seriousness or gravity of the harm.159 
 
With demand for water continuing to rise in states following riparian 
rights—a demand that rose explosively with the recognition of 
ecological demand for water in the 1970s—states had to confront the 
shortcomings of traditional riparian rights.  Legislatures, as we shall see, 
chose to replace riparian rights with regulated riparianism.160  Courts, 
 
citations omitted).  See generally Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water, supra note 9, 
§§ 7.02(d)–.03(e). 
159. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 852 cmt. c (1939). 
160. See generally Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, Introduction to 
§ 9.03 (“More or less comprehensive regulated riparian statutes are [now] found in 18 of the 
31 states east of Kansas City.”). 
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unable to take such an extreme step, sought ways to improve the 
working of riparian rights.  Thus came the application of something like 
the already-noted natural flow theory against governmental entities.161  
At about the same time, the American Law Institute undertook a 
review of its summary of riparian rights in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.162  Frank Trelease, then Dean of the University of Wyoming 
School of Law and the leading water law expert of the time (but who 
had devoted his entire career to extolling the virtues of appropriative 
rights),163 served as Associate Reporter on the review. 
Trelease sought to introduce as much of appropriative rights as 
possible into traditional riparian rights, in other words to move riparian 
rights from its traditional common property approach toward a more 
private property approach to water allocation and use.164  To do so, he 
sought to introduce at least ten specific changes into the Restatement’s 
version of riparian rights.165  The two primary changes he sought to 
establish were to introduce a temporal priority into the balancing 
process of determining reasonableness166 and a broadening of the 
relationship between uses on riparian land and uses on non-riparian 
land.167  Temporal priority, in fact, has never played much, if any, role in 
the application of riparian rights168 and one cannot find a court that has 
followed this or almost any other aspect of the Restatement (Second)’s 
approach to riparian rights.169  The Georgia Supreme Court has taken up 
 
161. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 41 (1979). 
163. See, e.g., Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the 
Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207 (1974); Frank J. Trelease, New Water 
Legislation: Drafting for Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, 12 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 385 (1977); Frank J. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property 
Rights, Economic Forces and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1965). 
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, intro. note to ch. 41 & app. to 850A (1982). 
165. See Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 16, § 6.01(c). 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A(h), cmt. k & app. 
167. Id. §§ 855–857, app. 
168. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water, supra note 9, § 7.03(d). 
169. Thus far, courts in 18 reported cases have referred to the Restatement (Second) 
regarding riparian rights; nearly all were general references that did not play a major role in 
the decision.  New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 612–13 (2008); Virginia v. Maryland, 540 
U.S. 56, 82 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lopardo v. Fleming Cos., 97 F.3d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 
1996); Okaw Drainage Dist. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 882 F.2d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir. 
1989); Harthman v. Texaco Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1254 (D.V.I. 1993); Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. 
v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (relying on the Restatement (Second) in 
its decision), rev’d, 869 A.2d 626, 630–31, 634–37 (Conn. 2005) (relying on caselaw and 
common law rule); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (Ga. 1980); In re Water Use Permit 
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at least part of the Restatement (Second)’s reordering of the relationship 
between riparian and non-riparian uses, recognizing the right of a non-
riparian user who has purchased or leased the right to use water from a 
riparian owner.170  But, to what extent this would have lasting import in 
Georgia is far from clear because the state has now adopted a regulated 
riparian system for its larger water users.171 
VI.  THE REPLACEMENT OF TRADITIONAL RIPARIAN RIGHTS BY 
REGULATED RIPARIANISM 
The various transformations of riparian doctrine have resulted from 
a complex interplay between climate, stages of economic development, 
and inherited legal theory.172  This process was illustrated dramatically in 
the rejection or modification of riparian rights in western states in favor 
of temporal priority based on when water was appropriated (first in 
time, first in right).173  The process of modifying or abandoning 
traditional riparian rights continues today, with many eastern states 
abandoning classic riparian rights in favor of a new permit system that is 
based on riparian, rather than appropriative, principles.174  With the 
demand for water for various uses continuing to increase in the East, 
even as population growth has stabilized or, in some areas, gone into 
 
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 449, 472 n.64, 473 (Haw. 2000); Alderson v. Fatlan, 898 N.E.2d 595, 
600, 601 n.4 (Ill. 2008); Colwell Sys., Inc. v. Henson, 452 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); 
Mich. Citizens for Water Conserv. v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., 709 N.W.2d 174, 194, 195, 
196, 200 & n.39, 201, 203–04 nn.44–48, 205, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Lake Mille Lacs Inv., 
Inc. v. Payne, 401 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Koch v. Aupperle, 737 N.W.2d 869, 
879 n.30 (Neb. 2007); Baumler v. Town of Newstead, 668 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796–97 (N.C. 1977); Franco-Am. Charolaise, 
Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 574 nn.25 & 27, 575 n.40 (Okla. 1990); Alburger v. 
Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729, 737 & nn.1 & 4, 738 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (Doyle, J., 
dissenting).  Only in Pyle v. Gilbert did the court rely on the Restatement (Second) to change 
the law of riparian rights. 
170. Pyle, 265 S.E.2d at 588–89. 
171. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a), (c), (e)–(g), (k)–(n) (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also 
Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening 
of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 65–73 (2002). 
172. HORWITZ, supra note 91, at 34–54 (discussing economic development); Abrams, 
supra note 91, at 1388–1400 (discussing inherited legal theory, climate, and economic 
development). 
173. See Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 49, § 8.04. 
174. See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(a)(5).  The only 
attempt to introduce appropriative rights into an eastern state (Mississippi) utterly failed.  See 
Dellapenna, Dual Systems, supra note 49, § 8.05–.05(b). 
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decline, recurring water shortages have become more frequent.175  The 
pressures for change will only accelerate under the impact of global 
climate change.176  As a result, users of water increasingly find their need 
for water to be in conflict with the needs of other, formerly-compatible 
users; there simply is not enough water to satisfy all needs in the eastern 
states any longer.  In this setting, the shortcomings of traditional 
riparian rights come to the fore, particularly their inability to prevent a 
tragedy of the commons.177 
Today, about half of the states that were once committed to 
traditional riparian rights have now enacted new regulatory systems that 
have come to be called “regulated riparianism.”178  There even is a 
model law for such statutes: The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code 
of the American Society of Civil Engineers.179  The name “regulated 
riparianism”180 emphasizes both that the administrative permit process 
 
175. See, e.g., SUSAN J. MARKS, AQUA SHOCK: THE WATER CRISIS IN AMERICA 1–5 
(2009) (stating that water shortages are becoming more frequent in the East).  On population 
change patterns across the United States, see Population Change and Distribution 1990 to 
2000, NATIONALATLAS.GOV (Jan. 26, 2011), http://nationalatlas.gov/articles/people/a_popcha
nge.html#five. 
176. See Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, at 409–11. 
177. Hardin, supra note 78.  See discussion supra text accompanying notes 78–87, 125–
28. 
178. Because some states have adopted a regulated riparian system through incremental 
statutory change rather than a single, dramatic enactment, the list of adopting states is not 
entirely settled.  As of 2011, my own compilation includes Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  In 
several of these states, the regulatory system has not been implemented or has only been 
partially implemented.  See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03. 
179. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, ASCE/EWRI std. 40-03, REGULATED RIPARIAN 
MODEL WATER CODE (2003) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. The Model Code includes 
exhaustive references to comparable provisions of actual regulated riparian statutes.  
180. I devised the name “regulated riparianism” some twenty years ago. Joseph W. 
Dellapenna, Owning Surface Water in the Eastern United States, 6 E. MINERAL. L. FOUND. 
§ 1.03(3) (1985).  This name has now gained general acceptance.  See, e.g., City of Waterbury 
v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102, 1155–57 (Conn. 2002); Babcock, supra note 102, at 
1206–08, 1217–19, 1234, 1238; Mayland, supra note 103, at 687, 690, 696, 720; D.S. Pensley, 
The Legalities of Stream Interventions: Accretive Changes to New York State’s Riparian 
Doctrine Ahead?, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 111–23, 145 (2008); Smith, supra note 82, at 
454, 472, 474; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000) 
(referring to the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code for guidance in interpreting the 
Hawaii permit statute).  The term has even entered into wider public discourse.  See, e.g., 
Leah J. Knowlton, When the Tap Runs Dry, the Dockets May Flow, DAILY REP. (Fulton 
Cnty., Ga.), June 16, 2008, at 18; Charles A. Nichols, Editorial, Can W. Va. Conserve 
Resources Under Its Nose?, SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Mar. 14, 2004, 
at 1D. 
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proceeds essentially on riparian principles, and that the new system is a 
regulation of, rather than a taking of, riparian rights.181  In these states, 
the basic concepts of riparian rights remain in place, but the concepts 
are managed through an elaborate administrative system that serves not 
only to protect the public interest but also to determine the rights of 
individual users among themselves.182  In short, these states have moved 
from a common property system to a public property system in which 
the uses of water are managed at the state or local level by a 
governmental agency with varying degrees of community involvement.183 
I have written extensively elsewhere about the characteristics and 
functioning of regulated riparian systems and will therefore only briefly 
summarize those features here.184  Basically, the system authorizes the 
use of water only through time-limited permits from the state within 
which the withdrawal occurs.185  The permits determine water rights, not 
the riparian nature of the use;186 yet, the new laws remain within the 
riparian tradition because the criterion of decision is a “reasonable use” 
of the water.187  Temporal priority has only a strictly limited role in the 
permit process, setting these laws apart from appropriative rights.188  
Because the reasonableness of a use is determined before it begins 
rather than only when the use is challenged in court, water users are 
able to know that for the duration of the permit their use will be held to 
be reasonable and thus can gauge whether their investments can be 
profitable as well as enabling investors about the proper scale of the 
investment.189  Upon expiration of a permit, the continued 
 
181. See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, §§ 9.01, .04(a)–(b). 
182. See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.01. 
183. See Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, supra note 16, § 6.01(b)–(b)(1). 
184. See generally Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, at § 9.01. 
185. MODEL CODE, supra note 179, § 6R-1-01; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, 
supra note 8, § 9.03(a)–.03(a)(4).  The duration of permits range from three to twenty years. 
Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(b)(4).  The Regulated Riparian 
Model Water Code sets the duration of its permits at twenty years.  MODEL CODE, supra, 
§ 7R-1-02. 
186. MODEL CODE, supra note 179, § 2R-1-02; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, 
supra note 8, § 9.03(a). 
187. MODEL CODE, supra note 179, §§ 2R-1-01, 2R-2-20, 6R-3-01, 6R-3-02; Dellapenna, 
Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(a), .03(b)(1).  Some jurisdictions would substitute 
the terms “beneficial,” “reasonable-beneficial,” or “equitable” for “reasonable.” 
188. MODEL CODE, supra note 179, §§ 6R-1-03, 6R-3-02; Dellapenna, Regulated 
Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(b)(3). 
189. See MODEL CODE, supra note 179, §§ 6R-2-01 to 6R-2-08, 6R-3-02, 6R-3-05; 
Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(a)(5)(A), .03(b)(1)–.03(b)(3). 
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reasonableness of the use is reexamined, introducing a desirable 
flexibility into the development, use, and protection of water 
resources.190  Regulated riparian statutes also include numerous 
provisions for the protection of the public interest.191 
Some commentators have expressed concern that if the duration is 
too short it will discourage investment in water-use facilities, but this 
does not seem to have been a problem in practice even in the states with 
the shortest durations.192  Administering agencies have been, if anything, 
too sensitive to the fears of large institutional investors in water.  
Administering agencies seldom flatly refuse to renew a permit,193 
although new and more stringent conditions are sometimes attached at 
the time of renewal.  Agencies in fact work with major water users in 
crafting responses to water emergencies and contrary to the expressed 
intent of the regulated riparian statutes, they have not made their own 
expert determinations regarding the matter.194  In practice, these 
agencies often fail to exercise their managerial powers sufficiently rather 
than too aggressively.195  The cost of imposing an elaborate 
administrative system is substantial,196 which raises issues about the 
wisdom of creating the administrative machinery if it is not going to be 
implemented effectively, or in some states, at all.  Some states have 
reacted to these concerns by limiting their regulated riparian system to 
certain water basins or other areas of the state where the competition 
for water is most intense and therefore the need for administrative 
 
190. While some regulated riparian statutes allow for market transfers of permits, there 
is no reason to think such markets will function more effectively than they have under a 
private property system such as appropriative rights.  MODEL CODE, supra note 179, §§ 1R-1-
07, 7R-2-01 to 7R-2-04, 7R-3-05, 9R-1-01, 9R-1-02; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra 
note 8, § 9.03(d).  See generally Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right, supra 
note 13. 
191. MODEL CODE, supra note 179, §§ 1R-1-01, 3R-1-01 to 3R-2-05, 4R-2-01 to 4R-3-05, 
7R-3-01 to 7R-3-07; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, §§ 9.03(a)(3), 9.05–
.05(d). 
192. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.03(a)(4). 
193. See, e.g., Alexander Lane, N.J. Too Generous with Water, Critics Say State Permits 
for Big Users Rose Last Year, STAR–LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 28, 2003, at 21 (reporting 
increases in authorized water withdrawals during a major drought). 
194. See, e.g., id.; Tom Avril, There Are No Limits on Biggest Water Users, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 11, 2002, at A1; Natalie Garcia, R.I. Overuses Its Water Supply in Summer, 
Report Finds, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 30, 2008, at B2. 
195. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 193 (“Water enforcement needs to get to the point where 
[the state] is able to say no . . . [a]nd they haven’t been able to do that.”).  But see id. (“Some 
are criticizing [the state] for producing permits too slowly.”). 
196. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.05(a)(5)(C). 
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oversight is greatest.197  It will be interesting to observe how these 
systems evolve in the future. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
More likely than not, before long, little will be left of riparian rights 
as known in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century except 
perhaps for vestiges in the few geographic pockets where supplies of 
usable water continue to exceed local demand, for exempted smaller 
users, and for disputes over non-consumptive issues.198  Even steps such 
as the 2008 amendment to Ohio’s constitution that enshrines the 
reasonable use rule for the water of a lake or watercourse as a property 
right of riparian landowners199 may not prevent the eventual 
abandonment of traditional riparian rights in that state given the reality 
of water uses now and in the likely future.  After all, already, no state 
truly relies on only “pure” riparian rights.  All states have some 
regulatory statutes that deal with at least certain limited aspects of water 
quantity issues—regulating public water systems and perhaps certain 
other kinds of water use.200  Federal law, however, requires every state’s 
regulations on water quality issues to be consistent with federal 
standards.201  Lawyers and jurists will continue to adapt traditional 
 
197. Id. § 9.03(a)(1). 
198. Abrams, supra note 91, at 1383; see also Leslie M. MacRae, Water, Water 
Everywhere, But Much Less Than You Think, 11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 193–94 
(2003). 
199. OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 19b(D). 
200. Dellapenna, Global Climate Disruption, supra note 2, §§ 438–445.  See generally 
Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 8, § 9.02–.02(d). 
201. Section 303(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act provides as follows:  
 
 In order to carry out the purpose of this Act, any water quality standard 
applicable to interstate waters which was adopted by any State and submitted to, 
and approved by, or is awaiting approval by, the Administrator pursuant to this Act 
as in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, shall remain in effect unless the 
Administrator determined that such standard is not consistent with the applicable 
requirements of this Act as in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.  If the 
Administrator makes such a determination he shall, within three months after the 
date of enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, notify the State and specify the changes needed to meet such requirements.  If 
such changes are not adopted by the State within ninety days after the date of such 
notification, the Administrator shall promulgate such changes in accordance with 
subsection (b) of this section.  
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riparian theory to modern needs.  It seems highly likely that this trend 
will continue. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(1) (2006); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water 
Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1168, 1171–72 & n.20 
(1983) (describing the reach of section 303 of the Clean Water Act and the need for states to 
adhere to federal water-quality standards). 
